Riots Reveal Organized Crime Power in Brazil

Last weekend, Brazilians living in the greater Sao Pauloand civilians that the security sector here has a long
metropolitan area witnessed one of the country'sway to go before it has any significant control over
largest prison riots in the past five years, organizedorganized crime. These rebellions also highlight the
and orchestrated by Sao Paulo's largest criminalsuperior communication networks operated by
faction, the First Capital Command (PCC inBrazilian organized crime. Communication is
Portuguese).When Sao Paulo state authoritiesfundamental When Fernandinho Beira-Mar was
transferred some 756 PCC leaders, the PCC criminaltransferred from his prison cell in Rio de Janeiro after
enterprise, led by Willians Herbas Camacho (a.k.a.he orchestrated a prison riot there in September 2002
Marcola), implemented its plan to start riots in dozensto mask the assassination of rival gang leaders,
of prisons in Sao Paulo and around the country. Theyauthorities found a number of luxury items including silk
took advantage of the unusually lax securitypajamas. But what surprised them more was the
environment over the weekend when some 10,000number of abandoned cell phones. Reports from Rio
prisoners were given a day pass to visit families onde Janeiro daily, O Globo, claim that Beira-Mar used up
the outside for Mother's Day, and thousands moreto a dozen cell phones to communicate with
civilians entered prisons to visit inmates on the inside.Aslieutenants and other subordinates in his black market
one prison after another fell under the control of riotingnetwork of guns and drugs shipments and sales.In a
inmates, the hostage count rocketed into the hundreds.similar fashion, leaders of the PCC use cell phones to
Meanwhile, organized attacks on police stations aroundcommunicate with one another between prisons and
Sao Paulo kept security forces busy defendingbetween prisoners and gang members on the outside.
themselves. At the same time, masked gunmenBoth the Civil Police and the Federal Police operate
commandeered city buses, ordering them evacuatedlistening posts, which enable security officials to piece
before burning them to the ground.The weekend's totaltogether actionable intelligence on plans for rebellions
included over 250 separate attacks on police stations,and other gang operations. However, the use of
stores, and other establishments. There were 115two-way radios has made that task much more
people killed, including 32 policemen and prison guardsdifficult.In both Rio and Sao Paulo, two-way radios are
and 71 gang members. Another 49 people wereused by criminals to relay messages to other
injured. Some 215 hostages were taken in 73 prisonincarcerated gang members and members on the
riots that occurred in prisons across Sao Paulo,outside. In some cases, one prisoner calls via cell a
Parana, Matto Grosso do Sul, Brasilia, and Bahia,subordinate on the outside who uses a two-way radio
according to Brazilian daily Folha de Sao Paulo. Overto transmit the message to a third individual who then
80 public transport buses were burned and one metrouses another cell phone to pass along the message to
station was attacked, leaving over five million peopleits recipient in another prison, reports O Globo. Each
without public transport. On 15 May, as millions ofnode on the communications chain may use any
people fled home in the early afternoon, Sao Paulonumber of cell phones or two-way radios, making
became a city of gridlock spanning 203 kilometers oftracking the signals very difficult.Attempts to block cell
roadways.Over the weekend, as the violence ragedphone signals in Rio and Sao Paulo have been
on, Brazilian Justice Minister Marcio Thomas Bastosineffective.In the middle of the Mother's Day weekend
offered the service of 4,000 soldiers, part of a Nationalriots, requests to shut down cell phone towers used by
Force trained to help contain the security problems incriminals to relay signals were presented to Brazil's
Brazilian states. But Sao Paulo Governor Claudiotelecommunications regulatory body when Marco
Lembo, filling in for presidential candidate GeraldoAntonio Desgualdo, the head of the Sao Paulo state
Alckmin, refused to accept federal help. Bastos madeCivil Police, met with this body, called Anatel, on 15 May.
the trip from Brasilia to Sao Paulo to again offerThe Folha de Sao Paulo reported that after the
federal assistance during a close-door meeting onmeeting Desgualdo announced that authorities would
Monday, 15 May. But again it was refused.By 16 May,not be able to shut down cell towers without the
as quickly as the violence had started, it ended, andacquiescence of telecommunications companies.These
most prisons were back in the control of statesame companies - Vivo, Tim, Telefonica, Embratel, and
authorities, and policemen were no longer the target ofNextel - complain that shutting down the towers would
random attacks. The Sao Paulo daily newspaper, Omean an unacceptable disruption of service for their
Estado de Sao Paulo, reported on 16 May that thelaw-abiding clients. Nothing short of a court order would
state government had reached an agreement with theshut down the towers, a legal instrument that takes
PCC. Government officials continue to deny that claim,too long to obtain.In some prison systems, cell phone
but it is possible such negotiations were a last-resortsignal blockers are used, but they are quickly rendered
option for state officials clearly caught off guard by aobsolete by the rapid pace of technological
highly organized criminal network, one many believedadvancement in cell phone systems.The battle
had been dismantled years ago. Brazilian organizedbetween Sao Paulo authorities and the cell phone
crime The PCC began to take shape in 1993, whencompanies to shut down towers in the event of
prisoners incarcerated in Taubate state prison in Saosecurity needs began in February 2001, when PCC
Paulo organized themselves to fight against deplorablemembers used cell phones to orchestrate
living conditions and more rights within the prisonsimultaneous riots in 29 prisons across Sao Paulo.
system. Over the past 13 years, this organization hasSecurity officials failed to win the battle then, too, but
grown into one of the country's most powerful prisonno one knew that such decisions five years ago would
criminal networks, controlling activity within dozens ofeventually facilitate the most violent uprising of Brazilian
prisons in Sao Paulo and around the country, as wellorganized crime in years. Corruption and politics Even
as important sales points and transport routes foras blocking cell signals and other methods to impede
drugs and guns flowing into Brazil from sourcecommunication between criminals evolves into what
countries such as Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia, andmay become a viable solution, many believe that such
Suriname.The PCC became more active outsidetime is wasted on treating a problem that is not central
prisons in 1999, when Rio's top criminal organization -to the real reason why the PCC was able to
the Red Command (CV in Portuguese) - formed anorchestrate such a widespread reign of disorder and
alliance with PCC members who lived in Heliopolis, arebellion. Corruption and politics, two of the usual
shantytown located in the southeastern zone of Saosuspects behind systemic dysfunction in democracies,
Paulo, according to a Rio de Janeiro Federal Policeare at the center of Brazil's security problems.Bribes
officer who asked to remain anonymous. Through thispaid to security officials at all levels keep leaders of
alliance, the CV sought to shift some of its drugthe PCC and the CV well informed of official planning.
trafficking activities from Rio de Janeiro to Sao Paulo.When authorities planned to move over 700 of the
In Rio, CV leaders had been constantly harassed byPCC leaders to a more secure prison environment to
police who exacted an extortion tax for allowingavoid what they learned was a planned Mother's Day
favelas (shantytowns) to be used as drug salesrebellion, the PCC reacted by launching its rebellion two
centers and contraband transshipment points.days early, disrupting the prisoner transport and a host
Additionally, the PCC in 1999 was a large criminalof other activities planned to prevent the rebellion.Low
organization with more manpower than economicsalaries exacerbate corruption because policemen and
activity. Its alliance with the CV increased earnings forsome lower-ranking members of the military are more
the PCC in Sao Paulo, while opening a new pool oflikely to sell weapons from poorly organized stock piles
man power for the CV to defend its turf from rivalto make ends meet. Over 70 per cent of the
gangs in Rio de Janeiro.Together, the two gangsweapons used by Brazilian organized crime were
control the drug trade in Brazil's two largest cities. Theymade in Brazil. Many of them are sold to Paraguay
operate gun smuggling routes out of Paraguay andwhere they enter the black market before returning to
purchase weapons from corrupt policemen and militaryBrazil. Yet a significant amount are sold to criminals
soldiers in Sao Paulo and Rio. High-level members ofdirectly from stockpiles of seized weapons.When
these gangs, especially the CV, continue to conduct abudgets must be prepared, politics dictate who gets
weapons-for-cocaine barter with members of thewhat slice of the pie. From 2004 to 2005, the Brazilian
leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombiafederal government reduced resources for the
(FARC) based in the Colombian Amazon.As recentlycountry's Penitentiary Fund by 37 per cent. This fund
as 30 April, three Colombians opened fire on a Brazilianoversees the overall improvement and maintenance of
patrol on the Rio Negro, a branch of the Amazon riverBrazil's prison system. Meanwhile, the government of
that begins in an area of the Colombian AmazonSao Paulo state diverted from public security spending
reportedly controlled by the FARC. Brazilian authoritiessome US$81.3 million in the last five years. It was a
claim that the rifles were stamped with the Braziliandecision in the reduction of security spending at the
military coat of arms. The men were followed to theSao Paulo state level that was likely made after the
Colombian city of San Felipe, where their arms were2001 prison riots in that state.Commenting on the event,
confiscated. Brazilian Federal Police investigators toldBrazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva
ISN Security Watch that they believe the arms weresaid it was a demonstration of the power of organized
part of a cache of weapons to be traded for cocainecrime in Brazil. His comments underline the fact that
that traffickers would transport to Sao Paulo andBrazilian organized crime is a force that has grown to
Rio.Red Command leader Fernandinho Beira-Mar isthreaten Brazilian cities as well as the nation. With links
considered to have been one of the first Brazilianto organized crime in Paraguay and Suriname, and a
criminals to trade weapons for cocaine with thethriving barter system with Colombia's FARC soldiers,
FARC. He was arrested by Colombian authorities inthe PCC and CV may soon become internationally
April 2001 and immediately extradited to Brazil. Yet theknown as a criminal network that has grown too big
recent incident on the Brazilian-Colombian border in thefor Brazil's security system to handle.Sam Logan ( is
Amazon indicates that five years later, this criminalan investigative journalist who has reported on security,
exchange program still continues to supply the CV andenergy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism,
the PCC with pure, Colombian cocaine.Brazilianand black markets in Latin America since 1999. He is
organized crime is just as powerful within the prisoncurrently completing his work on Nice Guys Die First, a
system as it is on the outside. And as the battleforthcoming non-fiction narrative about organized crime
continues to dismantle these criminal networks, thein Brazil.
occasional mega-rebellion reminds Brazilian authorities